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Abstract Traditionally, according to EU competition law, if an undertaking hold-
ing a dominant position refuses to grant access to its data to another undertaking,
this could potentially lead to an abuse precluded by Art. 102 TFEU. However, the
scope of this provision is limited as it only applies to dominant undertakings. Yet,
powerful data holders that do not benefit from such a dominant position might start
refusing to provide access to their data to undertakings with limited bargaining
power. This is notably illustrated by two cases in the USA, namely PeopleBrowsr v.
Twitter and hiQ v. LinkedIn. These two cases raise the question of whether the
concept of abuse of economic dependence could prove to be a valuable alternative
in order to deal with refusals, by non-dominant undertakings, to provide access to
data to undertakings with a weaker bargaining power. In this article, the rationale
for data access and sharing in light of the data’s characteristics will first be briefly
outlined. Then, the conditions of the abuse of economic dependence will be iden-
tified by relying on Belgian, German and French law. On these grounds, the article
will question whether a refusal to provide access to data could qualify as an abuse of
economic dependence.
Keywords Economic dependence  Relative market power  Data access  Data
sharing economy
1 Introduction
The European Commission has chosen to let the data market self-regulate and rely
on contractual freedom, while nevertheless proposing key principles for the
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undertakings wishing to engage in B2B data sharing agreements.1 In this context, it
will be necessary to keep an eye on potential market failures deriving from
discrepancies in bargaining power, having as a consequence that some undertakings
are not able to access certain data at all, or only at unreasonable conditions.2 While
this does not seem to be a major issue so far, it must nevertheless be noted that the
data market is only in its infancy and that only a limited number of undertakings
(6.3%) take an active part in B2B data sharing and re-use.3 As this market matures,
and as economic operators start to better perceive the value of data, one cannot
exclude that powerful data holders might start refusing to provide access to their
data to undertakings with limited bargaining power.
Traditionally, under EU competition law, if an undertaking holding a dominant
position refuses to grant access to its data to another undertaking, this could
potentially lead to an abuse precluded by Art. 102 TFEU.4 5 While the applicability
of the ‘‘essential facilities doctrine’’ case law6 to refusals to grant access to data has
been the topic of numerous academic contributions,7 some serious doubts have been
cast about its potential application to data markets,8 especially in light of the
‘‘indispensability’’ condition.9 Indeed, this requires demonstrating that ‘‘the data
owned by the incumbent is truly unique and that there is no possibility for the
competitor to obtain the data that it needs to perform its services’’.10
Moreover, Art. 102 TFEU might not often be called upon in practice because it
only allows targeting a limited number of undertakings, namely those holding a
dominant position in an identified market. Yet, powerful data holders that do not
benefit from such a dominant position could also start refusing to provide access to
their data to undertakings with limited bargaining power. For instance, in the USA,
Twitter suddenly decided to stop providing access to its ‘‘firehose’’ data to
PeopleBrowsr, a data analytics company, while this access had been provided freely
for years and while PeopleBrowsr had built its business model on this access.11
Similarly, after having allowed hiQ access and use of its data for several years,
LinkedIn requested hiQ to stop accessing its data, and used blocking techniques
preventing hiQ from doing so, while this access was at the core of hiQ’s business
1 European Commission (2018a), p. 10.
2 Barbero et al. (2018), pp. 92–93.
3 Barbero et al. (2018), p. 31.
4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326/47, 26 October 2012.
5 Drexl (2016), p. 44.
6 CFI, 17 September 2007, T-201/04, Microsoft I; ECJ, 29 April 2004, C-418/01, IMS Health; ECJ, 26
November 1998, C-7/97, Bronner; ECJ, 6 April 1995, joined cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, Magill.
7 See, inter alia, Graef (2016); Drexl (2016), pp. 44–55; Graef et al. (2015), p. 382.
8 See Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017).
9 For the essential facilities doctrine to apply, access to the essential facility has to be indispensable in
order to conduct a business on the secondary market.
10 Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016), p. 18.
11 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013; Graef (2016), p. 257.
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model.12 In these two cases, neither Twitter nor LinkedIn were considered as being
dominant.
These two cases, which will be discussed more extensively below,13 raise the
question of whether the concept of abuse of economic dependence could prove to be
a valuable alternative in order to deal with refusals, by non-dominant undertakings,
to provide access to data to undertakings having a weaker bargaining power. In this
article, the rationale for data access and sharing in light of the data’s characteristics
will first be briefly outlined (Sect. 2). Then, the conditions of the abuse of economic
dependence will be identified by relying on Belgian, German and French law
(Sect. 3). On these grounds, the article will question whether a refusal to provide
access to data could qualify as an abuse of economic dependence (Sect. 4).
2 Data Characteristics and the Rationale for Data Access and Sharing
Access to data is key for an undertaking’s competitiveness.14 Accordingly, the
European Commission promotes data access, sharing and re-use in order to
stimulate innovation.15 This is apparent, among other things, from its initiative to
create guidelines on B2B data sharing, and a Support Centre for data sharing whose
aim will notably be to collect best practices and existing model contract terms.16
The benefits of such data sharing stem from the fact that, as pointed out by the
OECD, data can, in principle, be considered as an ‘‘infrastructural resource’’.17
According to Frischmann, ‘‘infrastructure resources are a ‘shared means to many
ends’, which satisfy the non-rivalrous, the capital good and the general-purpose
criteria’’.18 First, data is a non-rivalrous good which can be consumed by an
unlimited number of actors – even simultaneously – and ‘‘maximising access to the
non-rivalrous good will in theory maximise social welfare, as every additional
private benefit comes at no additional cost’’.19 Second, data is often a capital good,
which means that it is used as an input for goods or services rather than as an end in
itself. This is because data have no intrinsic value as the value will derive from the
use made of this data. As data is a non-rival capital that ‘‘can in theory be used
(simultaneously) by multiple users for multiple purposes as an input to produce an
unlimited number of goods and services’’,20 data access and sharing is highly
valuable. Third, data may be described as a general-purpose good. Indeed, data
12 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
13 See Sect. 4. ‘‘Refusal to Provide Access to Data and Abuse of Economic Dependence’’.
14 Crémer et al. (2019), p. 76.
15 Graef and Prüfer (2018), p. 298.
16 European Commission (2018b).
17 OECD (2015), p. 179.
18 Frischmann (2012), cited in OCDE (2015), p. 179.
19 OECD (2015), p. 179–180.
20 OECD (2015), pp. 180–181.
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could in theory be used for an unlimited number of purposes, including public and
social purposes, and additionally, the use of data for one purpose can provide
valuable insights for uses in other domains, thus having significant spillover
effects.21
Nevertheless, promoting data access and sharing should not be done blindly, as it
also entails potential costs. Indeed, data sharing obligations might create disincen-
tives for data collection and processing. This is because, while sharing promotes
more competition by providing data access to competitors, imposing data sharing
might deter innovation by the incumbent compelled to provide access to its data.
The incumbent, due to the fear of free-riding, might no longer want to invest in data
collection, which used to provide it with a competitive advantage. Moreover,
imposing data sharing might also deter innovation by competitors who will no
longer see the point in innovating in order to collect the data themselves, as they
will receive it from the incumbent (expectation to free-ride).22 Finally, data sharing
obligations could also have negative effects on the protection of privacy and
business secrets.23
Accordingly, any policy initiative must take account of this trade-off between the
benefits and costs of data sharing,24 and data sharing obligations should only be
imposed if the benefits it creates outweigh the related costs. This fits into the broader
balancing between private and public/social interests and requires a case-by-case
analysis. However, it should be pointed out that, in light of the characteristics of
data outlined above, the benefits of data access are arguably greater than the benefits
of access to other goods, and the costs of data access are arguably smaller than the
costs of access to other goods. This serves as a rationale for those who call for more
data access and sharing in the European digital economy.
3 Abuse of Economic Dependence
Given that there is no harmonisation of the provisions pertaining to the abuse of
economic dependence in the EU, each Member State is free to adopt the rules that it
sees fit.25 For the purpose of this article, it has been chosen to focus on Belgium,
which adopted such a law on 4 April 2019,26 as well as on Germany and France,
which provided inspiration to the Belgian legislator.
21 OECD (2015), pp. 181–182.
22 De Streel, ‘‘From one bridge to another: The essential facilities doctrine and data’’ (to be published),
p. 14.
23 Crémer et al. (2019), p. 76.
24 Larouche (2008), pp. 616–620.
25 Art. 3.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the
rules on competition laid down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty Regulation (OJ L 1, 4 January 2003)
indeed allows Member States to adopt and apply on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or
sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.
26 Loi du 4 avril 2019 modifiant le Code de droit économique en ce qui concerne les abus de dépendance
économique, les clauses abusives et les pratiques du marché déloyales entre entreprises, M.B., 24 mai
2019.
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In Belgium, the law of 4 April 2019 added a new Art. IV.2/1 in the ‘‘Code de
droit économique’’ (hereinafter ‘‘CDE’’), which provides that:
The abusive exploitation, by one or more undertaking(s), of the state of
economic dependence of one or more dependent undertaking(s) is prohibited,
if competition is likely to be affected on the relevant Belgian market or a
substantial part of it.27
In Germany, § 20 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (hereinafter
‘‘Competition Act’’)28 provides that:
(1) § 19(1)29 in conjunction with paragraph 2 no. 1 shall also apply to
undertakings and associations of undertakings to the extent that small or
medium-sized enterprises30 as suppliers or purchasers of a certain type of
goods or commercial services depend on them in such a way that sufficient
and reasonable possibilities of switching to other undertakings do not exist
(relative or superior market power).31
In France, Art. L. 420-2, al. 2 of the French ‘‘Code de Commerce’’ provides that:
The abuse of the state of economic dependence of a client or supplier by an
undertaking or group of undertakings is also prohibited, if it is likely to affect
the functioning or structure of competition.32
Two main conditions for the application of these provisions are common to the
three Member States, namely the need to show a state of economic dependence (3.1)
and the need to show an abuse of this state of economic dependence (3.2).
3.1 State of Economic Dependence
The notion of economic dependence can be defined as the absence of sufficient and
reasonable possibilities of switching to other undertakings. According to Feteira:
27 Author’s translation of: ‘‘Est interdit le fait pour une ou plusieurs entreprises d’exploiter de façon
abusive une position de dépendance économique dans laquelle se trouvent une ou plusieurs entreprises à
son ou à leur égard, dès lors que la concurrence est susceptible d’en être affectée sur le marché belge
concerné ou une partie substantielle de celui-ci’’.
28 ‘‘Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’’ (Act against Restraints of Competition, adopted on 26
August 1998 and lastly amended on 12 July 2018). The official English translation of the Competition Act
is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html#p0066.
29 §19 Competition Act targets the prohibited conduct of dominant undertakings.
30 The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy recommended to abolish the
limitation of the benefit of § 20 Competition Act to SMEs, as it is well established that the situation of
dependence covered by this provision could also arise for large firms (Schweitzer et al. (2018)). An
English version of the summary of the report’s recommendations is available at https://www.bmwi.de/
Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Studien/modernisierung-der-missbrauchsaufsicht-fuer-marktmaechtige-
unternehmen-zusammenfassungenglisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFilev=3.
31 Official English translation: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.
html#p0066.




[It] is usually understood that the sufficiency of existing alternatives can be
assessed on objective grounds, whilst the reasonableness of resorting to such
alternatives necessarily entails a more subjective assessment which relies more
heavily on the possibilities available to the plaintiff.33 (emphasis in the
original text)
Though this is the specific wording used in Germany, the test is substantially the
same in France and Belgium. Indeed, French law requires to show the absence of an
equivalent solution (objective assessment of the sufficiency of alternatives) as it is
impossible for the plaintiff to resort to another undertaking due to technical or
economic reasons (subjective assessment of the reasonableness to resort to these
alternatives).34 Similarly, Belgian law requires to show the absence of an equivalent
alternative (objective assessment of the sufficiency of alternatives) for the
dependent undertaking to switch towards another undertaking within a reasonable
time frame, on reasonable terms and at reasonable cost (subjective assessment of
the reasonableness to resort to these alternatives).35
Contrary to the assessment of a position of dominance, which takes place in the
context of a given relevant market involving multiple actors, the assessment of a state
of economic dependence focusses on a bilateral relationship. This bilateral perspective
is at the core of these provisions, as the concern is not whether a dominant undertaking
has the market power to behave independently of the other actors on the market, but
rather whether an undertaking is dependent on its bilateral relationship with a (non-
dominant) undertaking in order to operate. This is apparent from the four classical case
groups of economic dependence, namely: assortment-based dependence36 (the other
party’s product is considered as a must-stock good due to its notoriety or popularity);
scarcity-based dependence37 (the other party is one of the rare sources where the good
can be found); dependence arising from a long-lasting business relationship38; and
33 Feteira (2016), p. 150.
34 Feteira (2016), pp. 167–168.
35 Article I.6, 4 CDE. Belgian law requires to show that, due to this lack of a reasonably equivalent
alternative, the stronger undertaking can impose services or conditions which could not be obtained under
normal market circumstances, but this condition is redundant with the definition of the abuse provided for
in Belgian law: ‘‘any behaviour that an undertaking can adopt because it holds the dependent undertaking
in a situation of economic dependence’’ (Proposition de loi du 22 février 2019 modifiant le Code de droit
économique en ce qui concerne les abus de dépendance économique, les clauses abusives et les pratiques
du marché déloyales entre entreprises, Doc., Ch., 2018-2019, n 3595/001, p. 15).
36 See for example German Federal Supreme Court, Designer Polstermöbel, 9 May 2000, WuW/DE-R
481; Depotkosmetik, 15 May 1998, WuW/DE-R 206; Reparaturbetrieb, 23 February 1988, WuW/E BGH
2479; Cartier, 10 November 1987, WuW/E BGH 2451; Adidas, 30 June 1981, WuW/E BGH 1885;
Rossignol, 20 November 1975, WuW/E BGH 1391. See decisions Nos. 87-MC-02, 25 March 1987; 89-D-
39, 13 December 1989; 93-D-48, 9 November 1993; 98-D-32, 26 May 1998; and 01-D-49, 31 August
2001 of the French competition authority.
37 See for example Berlin Court of Appeal, Agip II, 7 June 1974 and 4 July 1974, WuW/E OLG 1497 and
1499.
38 See for example BGH, Kfz-Vertragshändler, 21 February 1995, WuW/E BGH 2983; Herstellerleasing,
19 January 1993, WuW/E BGH 2875; Opel Blitz, WuW/E BGH 2491; Kraftwagenleasing, 30 September
1971, WuW/E BGH 1211. See decisions Nos. 89-D-16, 30 May 1989; 90-D-42, 6 November 1990; and
99-D-54, 29 September 1999, of the French competition authority.
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demand-based dependence39 (due to the other party’s importance in the undertaking’s
turnover).40
3.2 Abuse of the Economic Dependence
Showing a state of economic dependence is not enough, as it must also be shown
that there has been an abuse of this state. This calls for two types of considerations.
On the one hand, it is first necessary to discuss the types of conduct that may
constitute a potential abuse (3.2.1). On the other hand, the anticompetitive harm
deriving from this abuse must be questioned (3.2.2).
3.2.1 Types of Conduct that May Constitute a Potential Abuse
Any behaviour that an undertaking can adopt because it holds the dependent
undertaking in a situation of economic dependence may constitute a potential abuse.
Therefore, it will be necessary to show that the undertaking has exceeded the
reasonable exercise of its economic freedom and that it could not have adopted this
behaviour absent the state of economic dependence.41
In this regard, Belgian law proves particularly useful as Art. IV.2/1 CDE
identifies five practices that can be considered as abusive:
1 the unlawful refusal of a sale, purchase or other transaction conditions; 2
the direct or indirect imposition of purchase or sale prices or other unfair
trading conditions; 3 the limitation of production, markets or technical
development to the detriment of consumers; 4 the application of unequal
conditions to equivalent services to economic partners, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage; 5 the subjection of the conclusion of contracts
to the acceptance, by the economic partners, of additional services which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, are not related to the subject
matter of those contracts.42
39 See for example Federal Supreme Court, Konditionenanpassung, 24 September 2002, WuW/DE-R
948; Sehhilfen, 12 May 1976, WuW/E BGH 1423. See decisions Nos. 91-D-51, 19 November 1991;
94-D-60, 13 December 1994; 96-D-44, 18 June 1996; and 03-D-11, 23 February 2003 of the French
competition authority.
40 Feteira (2016), pp. 151–158 and 170–171.
41 Feteira (2016), p. 171; Proposition de loi du 22 février 2019 modifiant le Code de droit économique en
ce qui concerne les abus de dépendance économique, les clauses abusives et les pratiques du marché
déloyales entre entreprises, Doc., Ch., 2018-2019, n 3595/001, p. 15.
42 Author’s translation of: ‘‘1 le refus illicite d’une vente, d’un achat ou d’autres conditions de
transaction; 2 l’imposition de façon directe ou indirecte des prix d’achat ou de vente ou d’autres
conditions de transaction non équitables; 3 la limitation de la production, des débouchés ou du
développement technique au préjudice des consommateurs; 4 le fait d’appliquer à l’égard de partenaires
économiques des conditions inégales à des prestations équivalentes, en leur infligeant de ce fait un
désavantage dans la concurrence; 5 le fait de subordonner la conclusion de contrats à l’acceptation, par
les partenaires économiques, de prestations supplémentaires, qui, par leur nature ou selon les usages
commerciaux, n’ont pas de lien avec l’objet de ces contrats.’’
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This list provides some clarity regarding practices that could potentially be
considered as abusive, as it is presumed that an undertaking has adopted them
because it holds the dependent undertaking in a situation of economic dependence.
3.2.2 Anticompetitive Effects
As these provisions on the abuse of economic dependence are situated in the realm
of competition law, it seems natural that a form of anticompetitive effect must also
be demonstrated. Yet, this might seem counter-intuitive as, at first sight, these
provisions focus on bilateral relationships and not on a given market. To clarify this,
the ratio legis of these abuse of economic dependence provisions must be recalled.
In Belgian law, the stated objective is to protect weaker parties against stronger
undertakings who act unfairly by limiting marginally, and in the public interest,
their entrepreneurial freedom by sanctioning abusive conducts resulting from
positions of economic dependence.43 Similarly, abuse of economic dependence
provisions were introduced in French law in order to counter the economic power of
distribution groups that the rules of abuse of dominance were allegedly not able to
address, and in German law in order to tackle concerns over market conditions in
the retail market.44 This tends to show that the goal of such provisions is two-fold,
namely: (i) protecting weaker parties against stronger undertakings, and (ii)
countering the economic power of some non-dominant undertakings.
This illustrates the core challenge at hand when applying legal provisions relating
to economic dependence, as they require reaching a careful balancing between
‘‘safeguarding competition in the market, respecting freedom of contract and
protecting the freedom of competition of the weaker parties against powerful
business partners’’.45 Indeed, while the non-dominant undertaking has the freedom
not to contract (or to bring an end to an existing contract) with the dependent
undertaking, this might create anticompetitive effects by restricting the latter’s
freedom to compete, and more broadly by restricting market access and
contestability. A balance of interest thus has to be conducted, whose aim is to
protect the ability of the parties to take part in the process of competition and to
ensure that all benefit from an equal opportunity to enter and operate in the market.
This illustrates the core underlying tension between the parties’ individual interests
and the broader institutional interest in protecting the competitive process.46
More fundamentally, this illustrates the debate between the different approaches
of the economic role of competition law, namely whether the focus of competition
law should be on the efficiency of the market or the protection of the freedom to
compete.47 Incidentally, this debate is especially important for the effectivity of the
43 Proposition de loi du 22 février 2019 modifiant le Code de droit économique en ce qui concerne les
abus de dépendance économique, les clauses abusives et les pratiques du marché déloyales entre
entreprises, Doc., Ch., 2018–2019, n 3595/001, pp. 4–5.
44 Feteira (2016), p. 144–145 and 165.
45 Boy (2006), p. 218, cited in Bakhoum (2015), p. 14.
46 Feteira (2016), pp. 161–162.
47 Bakhoum (2015), p. 14.
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French and Belgian provisions, which explicitly state that the abuse has to be likely
to affect the functioning or the structure of competition.48
Under the ‘‘efficiency approach’’, the possibility to protect against abuses of
economic dependence through competition law is questionable because, as pointed
out by Bougette et al., ‘‘at first sight, an abuse of economic dependence involves
only a vertical relationship between two partners along a supply chain. It may not
affect any relevant markets and inflict harm only on a given undertaking’’.49 Indeed,
given that this issue of economic dependence is assessed in a bilateral relationship
and that the stronger undertaking is not required to have a dominant position, but
merely a relative market power towards the weaker undertaking, the exclusion by a
non-dominant undertaking’s behaviour of a small dependent undertaking may
arguably rarely be likely to affect the functioning or structure of competition under
the ‘‘efficiency approach’’. Indeed, showing that the mere exclusion of a dependent
undertaking from the market is likely to have such an effect is a major hurdle.50 For
instance, if an aftermarket service provider is dependent on a car manufacturer
having a 20% market share due to a long-lasting business relationship, and that the
latter terminates this relationship in an abusive way by refusing to keep providing
the necessary goods for the aftermarket service, the small undertaking will more
than likely not be able to show that this abuse of economic dependence is likely to
affect the efficiency of this aftermarket. Moreover, the competition authorities’
reluctance to deal with issues that appear to be more linked to contract law than to
competition law explains that cases of abuse of economic dependence have been
neglected in their decisional practice.51
However, under the ‘‘freedom to compete approach’’, protecting against abuses
of economic dependence may be justified in order to protect the market against
structural restrictions.52 As pointed out by Bougette et al.,
economic dependence related abuses can have significant effects on overall
welfare. Ignoring such abuses as potential anticompetitive behavior per se,
violates the fundamental idea of the effects-based approach, namely that
actual effects should trump formalistic assertions. Depending on the case in
question, consumer welfare and the competition process may be negatively
affected by (…) economic dependence abuses in several ways.53
Notably, the competitive process could be harmed if these abuses of economic
dependence undermine the undertakings’ possibilities to access the market.
Accordingly, such abuses should be sanctioned on the basis of competition law in
order to protect the freedom to compete.54 In this second perspective, the standard
48 Art. L. 420-2, al. 2 of the French Code de Commerce; Art. IV.2/1 of the Belgian Code de droit
économique.
49 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 6.
50 De Boüard (2007), pp. 298–299; Feteira (2016), p. 171.
51 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 6.
52 Bakhoum (2015), p. 17.
53 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 7.
54 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 8.
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for establishing that there is a likely effect on the functioning or the structure of
competition is lower as ‘‘intervention is required in order to protect freedom, as an
institution, and as an individual economic right’’.55 This second approach fits more
with the two-fold objective of the provisions pertaining to the abuse of economic
dependence, as the weaker party is not only protected because (i) it is in a situation
of unequal bargaining power (ii) but also because this ‘‘protects the competitive
process as a whole’’56 by countering the economic power of some non-dominant
undertakings. Indeed, ‘‘preserving market access cannot be seen as a non-economic
goal of antitrust legislation which can be criticised for an induced trade-off with
economic efficiency. Instead, freedom to access the market (contestability) is
considered a necessary condition for efficiency and long-run welfare’’.57 Therefore,
in light of this potential effect on the competitive process and of the potential
negative welfare it might entail, abuses of economic dependence should fall within
the scope of competition law.58 Of course, the standard should not be so low as to
protect firms that free-ride.59
4 Refusal to Provide Access to Data and Abuse of Economic Dependence
As indicated in the Introduction, refusals to provide access to data are traditionally
discussed under the realm of Art. 102 TFEU. However, this provision only allows
targeting undertakings holding a dominant position in an identified market. Yet,
powerful data holders that do not benefit from such a dominant position could also
start refusing to provide access to their data to undertakings with limited bargaining
power. To illustrate this, two US cases should be presented.
The first case is PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter.60 PeopleBrowsr’s business model was
to analyse Twitter data in order to resell information to clients about consumer
feedback towards products/services and to identify ‘‘influencers’’, via its access to
the Twitter ‘‘firehose’’ (all the tweets passing through Twitter on a real-time basis).
At one point, Twitter informed PeopleBrowsr and other third-party developers that,
as of 30 November 2012, it would cut the ‘‘firehose’’ tap and that PeopleBrowsr
would have to conclude a contract with one of Twitter’s certified data resellers in
order to get access to the ‘‘firehose’’ data.61 PeopleBrowsr argued that it was
dependent on this access in order to deliver the service it had built, and a San
Francisco court issued a temporary restraining order mandating Twitter to
temporarily keep providing access to the ‘‘firehose’’ to PeopleBrowsr. Unfortu-
nately, no decision on the merits of the case followed this preliminary injunction as
55 Bakhoum (2015), p. 17.
56 Kerber (2019), p. 29.
57 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 8.
58 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 10.
59 Bakhoum (2015), p. 17.
60 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
61 Graef (2016), p. 257.
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the parties settled the case in 2013, by agreeing that PeopleBrowsr would retain its
access to the ‘‘firehose’’ until the end of 2013, and would then have to transition
towards access via a certified data reseller in 2014.62
The second case is hiQ v. LinkedIn.63 hiQ’s business model was to provide
information to businesses about their workforces based on statistical analysis of
publicly available LinkedIn data.64 Their ‘‘Keeper’’ product told employers which of
their employees presented the greatest risk of being recruited by another company,
while their ‘‘Skill Mapper’’ product provided a summary of the workers’ skills. After
having allowed hiQ access and use of its data for several years (from 2012 to 2017), on
23 May 2017 LinkedIn sent a cease-and-desist letter requesting hiQ to stop accessing
its data, and used blocking techniques preventing hiQ from doing so. hiQ complained
and argued that its data analytics business was wholly dependent on the access to that
data, and that LinkedIn’s decision to block access to its data had an anticompetitive
purpose – namely to monetise this data itself with a competing product – and thus had
to be considered as an unfair competition practice. LinkedIn argued that its decision
was onlymotivated by the aim to protect its users’ privacy and to preserve their trust, to
which hiQ replied that it was only accessing data that users had willingly made public
to all. The Court concluded that hiQ had raised serious questions about whether
LinkedIn had unfairly leveraged its power in the professional networking market in
order to develop a competing product, and therefore issued a preliminary injunction
ordering LinkedIn to stop preventing hiQ’s access to the data. It will remain to be seen
whether the parties settle the dispute outside of the courts or whether a judgment on the
merits will be issued.
These two cases raise the question of whether the refusal, by a non-dominant
undertaking benefiting from a ‘‘relative or superior market power’’, to provide
access to data to another undertaking, whose commercial activity ‘‘depends’’ on this
access, could amount to an abuse of economic dependence.
To do so, this article will first outline the conditions that have to be met in order
for a refusal to provide access to data to be considered as an abuse of economic
dependence (4.1). Then, it will reflect on the categories of data potentially covered
by the access (4.2). Finally, the potential remedy will be discussed (4.3).
4.1 Conditions to Be Met in Order for a Refusal to Provide Access to Data to Be
Considered as an Abuse of Economic Dependence
The brief overview of the Belgian, German and French law has shown that two main
conditions for the application of these provisions are common to the three Member
62 Graef (2016), p. 257.
63 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
64 LinkedIn users can choose to keep their profiles entirely private, or to make them viewable by their
direct connections on the site, a broader network of connections, all other LinkedIn members or the entire
public (including internet users not registered on LinkedIn). In the case at hand, hiQ conducted its
business by automatically collecting, harvesting or ‘‘scraping’’ the data from the latter categories of
profiles (publicly available LinkedIn profiles).
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States, namely the need to show a state of economic dependence (4.1.1) and the
need to show an abuse of this state of economic dependence (4.1.2).
4.1.1 Assessment of the State of Economic Dependence
To determine whether the access seeker is dependent, in order to conduct its
business, on the access to the data of the undertaking having a superior market
power, a two-step assessment must be conducted: first an objective assessment of
the sufficiency of alternatives for any undertaking, and second a subjective
assessment of the reasonableness to resort to these alternatives for the access seeker.
4.1.1.1 Objective assessment of the sufficiency of alternatives for any undertak-
ing The first question is thus whether sufficient alternatives to the data held by the
undertaking having superior market power are available to any other undertaking.
It must be questioned whether the access seeker could, in theory, collect that data
itself or access it via another undertaking.
This first objective assessment is rather similar to the indispensability test of the
‘‘essential facilities doctrine’’. Indeed, according to the French ‘‘Autorité de la
concurrence’’ and the German ‘‘Bundeskartellamt’’, this indispensability test
requires to show that ‘‘the data owned by the incumbent is truly unique and that
there is no [other] possibility for the competitor to obtain the data that it needs to
perform its services’’.65
To be precise, the indispensability test does not require the demonstration of the
absence of ‘‘any alternative at all’’, but rather the absence of ‘‘a sufficient alternative
for any undertaking’’. Indeed, if one takes the example of a port used as the starting
point to cross a narrow sea, this infrastructure might be considered as an essential
facility for ferry operators even if there is another port 200 kilometres away, as this
alternative, though existent, might not be considered as ‘‘sufficient for any
undertaking’’ in this context.
This finding can be derived from the Bronner66 case, where the ECJ indicated
that in order for the indispensability of the facility (in casu a nationwide home-
delivery system for newspapers) to be established, there must be ‘‘obstacles capable
of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher [to
develop a substitute]’’67 (emphasis added).
If this objective assessment leads to the conclusion that there are no sufficient
alternatives to the data for any undertaking, then the indispensability test is met, and
the refusal, by a dominant undertaking, to provide access to that data could amount
to an abuse of dominant possition prohibited by Art. 102 TFEU, provided that the
65 Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt (2016), p. 18.
66 ECJ, 26 November 1998, C-7/97, Bronner.
67 ECJ, Bronner, para. 44.
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other conditions of the essential facilities doctrine are met.68 However, when
applied to data, it is questionable whether these other conditions can be met,
especially the condition pertaining to the indispensability of the dataset. This is
because, according to Colangelo and Maggiolino, if applied to data, the Bronner
case implies that data that is openly accessible online or can be purchased should
never be considered as indispensable, as virtually any undertaking can access it or
purchase it from data brokers.69 Graef is more nuanced. Though she agrees that data
that is truly non-rivalrous may not be considered as being indispensable, she
underlines that it should be kept in mind that this same data is excludable and can be
made exclusive through contractual or technical means.70 Yet, even if some data are
not accessible to all firms on an equal basis and are not sold by data brokers, this
does not necessarily imply that these data are necessarily indispensable, as long as it
is possible to find substitutes.71 This was notably affirmed by the European
Commission in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, where it indicated that a wide
number of undertakings collect user data for advertising purposes (Google,
Facebook, Amazon, eBay …).72 In the same vein, the user data at hand in the
PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter73 and hiQ v. LinkedIn74 cases should arguably not be
considered as indispensable either.
Moreover, if it appears from this objective assessment that no sufficient
alternatives to the data held by a non-dominant undertaking having superior market
power exist for any undertaking, it will de facto not be reasonable for the access
seeker to collect that data itself or to access it via another undertaking (subjective
assessment of the reasonableness to resort to these alternatives). Therefore, the state
of economic dependence will be established.
However, if this objective assessment leads to the finding that the data is not
indispensable and that there are, in fact, sufficient alternatives to the data, then it is
necessary to move on to the second step and to assess, from a subjective point of
view, whether it is reasonable for the access seeker to collect that data itself or to
access it via another undertaking.
68 (i) The refusal to grant access excludes all effective competition on the downstream market; (ii)
prevents the introduction of a new product/technological innovation; and (iii) there is no objective
justification for the refusal. See the case law and legal literature cited in footnotes 6 and 7.
69 Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), pp. 270–271.
70 Graef (2016), p. 267.
71 Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 273.
72 European Commission, Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp (2014), paras. 188–189; Colangelo
and Maggiolino (2017), p. 271.
73 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
74 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,




4.1.1.2 Subjective assessment of the reasonableness to resort to these alternatives
for the access seeker This subjective assessment is one of the key differences
between resorting to provisions of abuse of economic dependence and resorting to
Art. 102 TFEU, as the latter does not provide such a second step. This is because
Art. 102 TFEU requires an absolute indispensability (e.g. the access to the dataset is
indispensable for any undertaking), while the provisions of ‘‘abuse of economic
dependence’’ only require a relative dependence (e.g. the access to the dataset is
necessary in order for the access seeker to conduct its business, but it might not be
necessary for other undertakings).
This subjective assessment is about questioning whether it is reasonable, for the
access seeker, to collect the data itself or to access that data via another undertaking.
If it is reasonable to require this from the access seeker, then it is not in a state of
economic dependence. On the contrary, if it is not reasonable, then it should be
deemed to be in a state of economic dependence. To determine the reasonableness
of requiring the access seeker to collect the data itself or to access that data via
another undertaking, the technical and economic barriers to this alternative should
be considered. This means questioning whether the access seeker could collect the
data itself, or access that data via another undertaking, within a reasonable time
frame, on reasonable terms and at reasonable cost.
Such barriers are not new in the realm of competition law. As indicated earlier,
the ECJ held in the Bronner case that, in the context of Art. 102 TFEU, there must
be ‘‘obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for
any other publisher [to develop a substitute]’’75 (emphasis added). In Bronner, the
ECJ added that ‘‘it is not enough to argue that it is not economically viable by
reason of the small circulation of the daily newspaper or newspapers to be
distributed. For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it
would be necessary (…) to establish (…) that it is not economically viable to create
a second home-delivery scheme (…) with a circulation comparable to (…) the
existing scheme’’76 (emphasis added). This finding could be used to assess the
existence of economic barriers creating a situation of economic dependence.
Naturally, given that the provisions of ‘‘abuse of economic dependence’’ only
require a relative dependence, while Art. 102 TFEU requires an absolute
indispensability, the standard for recognising such an economic barrier should be
lower. Thus, the test could be reformulated as follows: Are there obstacles making it
unreasonably difficult for the access seeker (and not for any undertaking) to collect
75 ECJ, 26 November 1998, C-7/97, Bronner, para. 44.
76 ECJ, Bronner, §§ 45–46.
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the data itself or to access that data via another undertaking? Considering that the
assessment of dependence is relative and not absolute, it will be enough to argue
that it is not economically viable for the access seeker to do so due to its own limited
capacities, rather than having to show that it would not be economically viable for
an undertaking having the same capacities as the data holder.
More specifically for data, it should be outlined that access to data relevant for
competition is considered as one of the five factors to assess an undertaking’s power
in a multi-sided market and network.77 Therefore, ‘‘consumer lock-in’’78 and
‘‘network effects’’79 could constitute such economic and technical barriers that
make an access seeker dependant on another undertaking having relative or superior
market power. Indeed, if the users are locked-in the latter’s product or service –
because no alternative having reached a critical mass of users is available (network
effects) – the access seeker will be dependent on this undertaking as it is the only
viable connection to these users. The undertaking having superior market power
could thus be a ‘‘gatekeeper’’ of that user data as the access seeker would not be able
to collect the data itself, or to access that data via another undertaking, within a
reasonable time frame, on reasonable terms and at reasonable cost.
This ‘‘gatekeeper’’ situation was arguably present in the PeopleBrowsr v.
Twitter80 and hiQ v. LinkedIn81 cases. Indeed, PeopleBrowsr argued that its
business-model was dependent on the access to the Twitter ‘‘firehose’’ in order to
deliver the service it had built. It argued that Twitter’s data was unique and
essential as tweets ‘‘provide unique feedback regarding consumers’ reactions to
products and brands, (…) provide unique insight about which members of
communities are influential (…), [and other social networking sites, such as
Facebook] do not provide the same rich set of public data regarding users’
sentiments and influence’’.82 Similarly, hiQ argued that its data analytics business
was wholly dependent on the access to LinkedIn’s data. Like several other digital
platforms, Twitter and LinkedIn benefit from a form of ‘‘gatekeeper power’’ as
these companies serve effectively as infrastructure for digital markets. (…)
[T]his means that not only are the platforms vital intermediaries, but – in many
instances – they are the only real option. (…) The platforms generate too
77 §18, No. 3a Competition Act; Haucap (2018), p.10.
78 Consumers are ‘‘locked into’’ a service because no other reasonable alternative exists, having reached
a minimum scale (e.g. having a sufficient minimum number of users).
79 Having more costumers provides more data, which allows to improve the product/service. In turn,
improving the product/service attracts more consumers that provide additional data, which again allows to
improve the product/service, etc.
80 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
81 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
82 Declaration of John David Rich in support of the plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining
order in the case PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San
Francisco, November 2012, paras. 4–5, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/114846303/Rich-
Declaration-PB-v-TW-Restraining-Order-28-Nov-12, cited in Graef (2015), p. 499.
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much business and attract too many eyeballs for firms to bypass them entirely.
(…) Platforms can use their gatekeeper power to extort and extract better
terms from the users that depend on their infrastructure.83 (emphasis added)
An additional key factor for this ‘‘assessment of reasonableness’’ test lies in the
access seeker’s burden of proof, as it has to convince the competition authorities
that it is truly dependent on the access as it cannot reasonably collect the data itself
or access that data via other means. To do so, the access seeker has to provide clear
explanations about the product/service that it offers (or intends to offer) and the
reasons why that data is necessary for its (current or future) business model.84
Indeed, requiring these additional explanations would avoid that these provisions of
abuse of economic dependence are used as proxies for free-riding tactics, which
would deter innovation. This implies that access should not be granted to
undertakings that simply want to copy the data holder’s business model. Rather,
access to data through the provisions on the abuse of economic dependence should
only be provided if the access seeker offers (or wishes to offer) a different product/
service than the one offered by the data holder.
Arguably, this requirement was satisfied in the PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter85 and
hiQ v. LinkedIn86 cases. Indeed, PeopleBrowsr’s business model was to analyse
Twitter data in order to resell information to clients about consumers’ feedback
regarding products/services and to identify ‘‘influencers’’. It therefore did not access
Twitter’s data in order to copy its business model and to create a similar social
network, but rather to provide new added-value services on the basis this data.
Similarly, hiQ’s business model was to provide information to businesses about
their workforces based on statistical analysis of publicly available LinkedIn data, by
telling employers which of their employees presented the greatest risk of being
recruited by another company and by providing a summary of the workers’ skills.
Once again, this access to LinkedIn’s data was not made to copy its business model
and to create a similar professional social network, but rather to provide new added-
value services.
Finally, a last word must be said about the necessity to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of accessing the requested data via other means, and this has to do
with the data portability right contained in the EU General Data Protection
83 Khan (2018), pp. 13–14. See also Bougette et al. (2018), p. 14.
84 Naturally, the access seeker should be careful not to provide too much information, in order to avoid
the application of Art. 101 TFEU because of a risk of tacit collusion. However, this latter issue could be
solved by preventing the data holder’s department dealing with the data access request from sharing this
specific information with other departments. Moreover, if some of the data to which the access is
requested is personal data, providing explanations about the product/service that it intends to offer will
also be necessary to comply with the core processing principles of Art. 5 GDPR, and notably the principle
of purpose limitation.
85 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
86 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
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Regulation (hereinafter ‘‘GDPR’’).87 Indeed, Art. 20.2 GDPR grants to the data
subject88 the right to transfer the personal data89 that he/she has provided90 to a data
controller,91 directly from one controller to another without hindrance from the
original controller, where technically feasible. This means that, if technically
feasible, the second data controller can ask the data subject to exercise his
portability right in order to transfer to him the data that he/she has provided to the
original controller. In this way, the second data controller can thus get access to
some of the original controller’s data through the intermediary of the data subject.
Therefore, if this right to data portability turns out to be efficient in practice, an
undertaking will struggle to argue that it is dependent on the data holder’s wilful
granting of an access to such data, as it can obtain access to the same data via
another channel, namely through the intermediary of the data subject. However, if
this data portability right turns out to be inefficient – notably if it is not technically
feasible to port the data directly from one undertaking to the other (lack of
interoperability) – this tool should not be considered as a reasonable alternative
mean to get access to the personal data that the access seeker depends on for his
business model.
4.1.2 Assessment of the Abuse
After having established that the access seeker is in a state of economic dependence
towards the data holder, it will be necessary to determine whether the refusal, by the
latter, to provide access to the data constitutes an abuse of such economic
dependence. This second condition calls for two types of considerations. On the one
hand, it is first necessary to demonstrate a conduct that constitutes a potential abuse
(4.1.2.1). On the other hand, the anticompetitive harm deriving from this abuse must
be proven (4.1.2.2).
87 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J., L 119, 4 May
2016.
88 ‘‘An identified or identifiable natural person’’ (Art. 4.1 GDPR).
89 ‘‘Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘‘data subject’’); an
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that
natural person’’ (Art. 4.1 GDPR).
90 Considered as ‘‘provided’’ are the data actively and knowingly provided by the data subject (name,
age, email address …) and the observed data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the
service or the device of the data controller (search history, traffic and localisation data, number of
footsteps per day collected by a smart watch …), but not the inferred data and derived data that are
created by the data controller on the basis of the data ‘‘provided’’ by the data subject (user profiles, results
of an evaluation of the data subject’s health based on the data that its smart watch has collected …) (WP
29 (2017), p. 10).
91 ‘‘The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’’ (Art. 4.7 GDPR).
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4.1.2.1 Demonstrating conduct that constitutes a potential abuse In Belgian law,
Art. IV.2/1, 1 CDE explicitly identifies the unlawful refusal to supply as a practice
that can be considered as abusive. Similarly, in French law, Art. L.420-2, al. 2 of the
Code de Commerce provides that a refusal to sell may be abusive. An unlawful
refusal to supply/provide access to data to an undertaking which has demonstrated
that it is dependent on this access – as it cannot reasonably collect the data itself or
access that data via other means – could thus, in certain circumstances, be abusive.
The key issue is to determine when such a refusal to provide access to the data is
unlawful. Two possible sets of cases should be outlined.
In the first set of cases, the access seeker has already developed his product/
service on the basis of the access to the data holder’s data, and the latter decides to
‘‘close the tap’’ and to no longer provide access to this data (termination of an
existing business relationship). The question is whether this refusal to continue
providing access to data for the future, while access had been provided in the past
which allowed the dependent undertaking to build its product/service, constitutes an
unlawful restriction of the latter’s possibility to compete in the market, amounting to
an abuse. In this regard, it should be noted that the European Commission indicates
in its guidance on abusive exclusionary conducts by dominant undertakings that
terminating an existing business relationship is more likely to be abusive than a de
novo refusal to supply because of the relationship-specific investments that have
already been made.92
Once again, the PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter93 and hiQ v. LinkedIn94 cases could
arguably be considered as conducts that constitute a potential abuse. Indeed, in both
these cases, the data holders let another undertaking develop an added-value service
on the basis of the free access to its data, creating the impression that they could
create a perennial business-model via this free access. Yet, once Twitter and
LinkedIn realised that these services had added-value and that PeopleBrowsr and
hiQ were dependent on this access, they decided to terminate the existing business
relationship. This conduct could potentially be abusive if it generates anti-
competitive effects.95
In the second set of cases, the access seeker has no pre-existing business relation
with the data holder, and alleges that it is dependent on the data holder’s data to
launch a new product/service, which is not a simple copy of the data holder’s
business model, but rather aims at creating added-value (refusal to supply). In this
example, there could potentially be an abuse if the undertaking has exceeded the
reasonable exercise of its economic freedom and that it could not have refused the
access absent the state of economic dependence. To do so, the conduct, in casu, of
92 European Commission (2009), para. 84.
93 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr), No.
C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
94 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
95 See infra Sect. 4.1.2.2.
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the undertaking having a superior market power towards the dependent undertaking
should be compared with the conduct of a similar undertaking operating in a similar
market (e.g. in other countries or in markets for similar products/services) where
there is no dependence.
For instance, Kerber raises the question of whether the refusal, by car
manufacturers, to provide access to vehicle data to independent repair services
and providers of complementary services (e.g. on-board applications), while access
is provided to official distributors or ‘‘certified’’ service providers, could amount to
an abuse of economic dependence.96 He points out, in this regard, that ‘‘it can be
argued that under certain conditions firms on aftermarkets and in IOT-contexts with
several stakeholders that need access to the same data for offering valuable services
might claim access to the data that one stakeholder holds exclusively’’.97 Moreover,
and because refusal to supply access to data might not fit perfectly within the four
traditional case groups of abuse of economic dependence identified earlier, Kerber
suggests to develop a new case group for cases where data holders have a de facto
exclusive control on the access to certain data sources and where they might abuse
from the state of economic dependence of other firms who need this access in order
to offer products or services to the users.98 To support this, Kerber relies on the
report of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, which
indicated that:
It may be useful to clarify in § 20 para. 1 Competition Act99 that a relevant
form of dependence may also result from an undertaking being dependent, in
order to achieve a substantial value creation within a value creation network,
on access to automatically generated machine or service usage data that is
exclusively controlled by another company; and denial of access to data can
constitute an unreasonable exclusionary conduct, even if markets for such
data do not yet exist.100 (emphasis added)
Once again, the importance of the access seeker’s explanations about the product/
service that it intends to offer, and about the reasons why that data is necessary to
offer that product/service, will be paramount in order to avoid free-riding tactics that
would deter innovation.
96 Kerber (2018), p. 329.
97 Kerber (2018), p. 329.
98 Kerber (2019), p. 32. For a more thorough analysis of how this could be applied to the automotive
sector, where the car manufacturers might have such de facto exclusive control, see pp. 28–35.
99 The benefit of the protection of § 20 Competition Act is not limited to undertakings engaged in
existing agreements or business relations, but may extend to undertakings willing to enter into such
agreements or relations (Feteira (2016), p. 152).
100 Schweitzer et al. (2018), p. 5.
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4.1.2.2 Demonstrating the anticompetitive harm deriving from this abuse Addi-
tionally, the anticompetitive harm deriving from this abuse must be proven. As we
have discussed above,101 the ‘‘freedom to compete approach’’ of the economic role
of competition law fits more with the two-fold objective of the provisions pertaining
to the abuse of economic dependence, as the weaker party is not only protected
because (i) it is in a situation of unequal bargaining power, but also (ii) because this
‘‘protects the competitive process as a whole’’102 by countering the economic power
of some non-dominant undertakings. Indeed, ‘‘freedom to access the market
(contestability) is considered a necessary condition for efficiency and long-run
welfare’’.103 Abuses of economic dependence might thus be sanctioned in order to
protect the freedom to compete, as an institution, and as an individual economic
right.104
The first set of conducts outlined above (termination of an existing business
relationship), can indeed have anticompetitive effects. To illustrate this, the
PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter105 and hiQ v. LinkedIn106 cases should once again be
outlined. In PeopleBrowsr, Twitter’s conduct might have been considered as
anticompetitive, as it can arguably be defined as a ‘‘leveraging’’ behaviour by which
Twitter intended to foreclose competition in this downstream analysis market to the
benefit of its certified resellers.107 Additionally, it could also be argued that
Twitter’s conduct was anticompetitive as it waited for a data re-user, in casu
PeopleBrowsr, to show the lucrative nature of a market based on the ‘‘firehose’’ data
analysis before reserving that market to its certified data resellers.108 Similarly,
LinkedIn’s conduct does tend to indicate an anticompetitive ‘‘leveraging’’ behaviour
by which it intended to foreclose competition in the downstream analysis market by
developing a competing product after having waited for a data re-user, in casu hiQ,
to show the lucrative nature of a such a data analysis market. In both of these cases,
it seemed necessary to protect the access seekers’ freedom to compete.
Similarly, the second set of conducts outlined above (refusal to supply), might
also have anticompetitive effects as there might be cases where the refusal to
provide access to the data unlawfully restricts the access seeker’s possibility to
compete in the market. In this regard, the final report on ‘‘Competition Policy for the
digital era’’ outlined that:
[W]here a machine producer enjoys some degree of market power, or even just
bilateral power, the bargaining power of a machine user may not suffice. A
101 See supra Sect. 3.2.2 Anticompetitive Effects.
102 Kerber (2019), p. 29.
103 Bougette et al. (2018), p. 8.
104 Bakhoum (2015), p. 17.
105 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr),
No. C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
106 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
107 Graef et al. (2015), pp. 384–385; Graef (2016), p. 257.
108 Abrahamson (2014), p. 874, cited in Graef (2016), p. 257.
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number of experts and industry participants argue that exclusive control over
machine usage data then leads to the foreclosure of secondary markets and
may significantly reduce the contestability of a machine producer’s position on
the primary market, due to a data-driven lock-in of machine users.109
(emphasis added)
4.2 Categories of Data Potentially Covered by the Access
If the conditions identified above are fulfilled, the provisions prohibiting the abuse
of economic dependence could theoretically be applied to the refusal to provide
access to data. Yet, it is still necessary to determine the categories of data potentially
covered by the access.
Indeed, depending on this scope, the consequences for the non-dominant data
holder, and for the data subjects in case personal data are involved, could vary
greatly. This is because the true value is not in the data as such, but rather in the
economic value of the information and knowledge that can be extracted from it.110
In fact, raw data, whether personal or not, has little value in itself, and only becomes
valuable once it has been structured and organised (transforming it into informa-
tion), and even more so when this information is analysed to extract knowledge.111
Moreover, access could be requested to personal or non-personal data. This latter
distinction could, however, be rather artificial in some cases, as it might not be easy
to determine whether or not specific data should be considered as personal.112 This
is because, due to the constant development of Big Data113 analytics, data
considered today as non-personal could later become personal if it is merged with
other datasets, allowing the re-identification of data subjects. Of course, some data
will more than likely always remain non-personal, such as data generated by
industry machines in a production line equipped with sensors.
This article argues that the categories of personal and non-personal data
potentially covered by the access should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and
that the access should only be limited to the data that the access seeker is dependent
on, in light of the conditions identified in Sect. 4.1. Indeed, in each case, a trade-off
must be made between the benefits of protecting the weaker party (the dependant
access seeker) and the costs of the access in terms of incentives to innovate and to
109 Crémer et al. (2019), p. 88.
110 De Streel, ‘‘From one bridge to another: The essential facilities doctrine and data’’ (to be published),
p. 14.
111 Gal and Rubinfeld (2019), p. 9.
112 In the same vein, the data continuum described above (raw – structured – analysed) might not
necessarily apply in all situations, notably because Big Data analytics also allows the analysis of
unstructured data.
113 ‘‘‘Big data’ is a field that treats ways to analyse, systematically extract information from, or otherwise
deal with data sets that are too large or complex to be dealt with by traditional data-processing application
software (…) Big data was originally associated with three key concepts: volume, variety, and velocity.




collect data. In practice, the access seeker might be dependent on the access to
personal or non-personal data.
4.2.1 Personal Data
The access seeker might first be dependent on the access to personal data held by the
undertaking having a superior market power. Indeed, some of the consumer data
collected by this undertaking could be highly valuable for the access seeker and it
might be dependent on it. In practice, access requests to personal data are frequently
targeted at ‘‘observed data, which often cannot be replicated, and volunteered data
that would take a significant amount of effort to volunteer again’’.114 This was
notably the case in PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter115 and hiQ v. LinkedIn.116
To determine which types of personal data should fall within the scope of the
economic dependence provisions, a trade-off must be made between the benefits of
protecting the dependant access seeker and the costs of the access in terms of
incentives to innovate and to collect data. In this regard, it should be outlined that
the most valuable personal data for the data holder will generally not be the data that
has been provided by the data subject (actively or through his/her use of the data
holder’s product/service), but rather the data that the data holder has inferred on the
basis of this primary data, as these secondary data are what provides the true added-
value to their service. For instance, the true added-value of the services offered by
Fitbit is not that the bracelet calculates the number of steps a person takes in one
day, but rather the insights that are derived from this calculation and the
personalised advice that is provided, on this basis, to this user. Similarly, Argenton
and Prüfer, suggest that search engines should share their data on previous searches
as the true added-value of search engines does not derive from this collection, but
rather from the referencing services that it offers through the analysis of the
collected data.117
In light of the above, access should only be provided to the well-identified
categories of personal data that the access seeker is dependent on, and only if a
trade-off has been made and concludes that the benefits for the access seeker trump
the costs of the access in terms of incentives to innovate and to collect data for the
data holder. Naturally, providing access to personal data would require compliance
with the GDPR. In this regard, one way to circumvent the GDPR would be to
anonymise the personal data before providing access to it, as the data would then no
114 Crémer et al. (2019), p. 101.
115 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr),
No. C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
116 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
117 Argenton and Prüfer (2012), p. 73. The two-sided market nature of search engines should, however,
not be ignored. Given that they are remunerated by the revenue from advertising and not by the searches,
an imposition to share this search data could undermine the viability of the service if it is used by the
access seeker to provide competing online advertising services.
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longer be subject to the GDPR. However, truly effective anonymisation118 is
difficult to achieve, and the mere pseudonymisation119 of the data would not be
sufficient as pseudonymised data remain personal data subject to the GDPR, given
that the data subject can still be re-identified.
4.2.2 Non-Personal Data
The access seeker might also be dependent on the access to some of the non-
personal data held by the undertaking having a superior market power. For instance,
an independent repairer could be dependent on the access to car performance data
held by a car manufacturer in order to be able to offer adequate repair services.
Once again, in order to determine which types of non-personal data could fall within
the access request, a trade-off has to be made between the benefits and the costs of
access. In this regard, one of the elements that could be taken into consideration is
whether the data to which the access is requested has been collected as part of the
data holder’s core business, or whether it has been collected as a by-product of this
core business.
This is because the costs of access in terms of incentives to innovate and to
collect this data in both scenarios are arguably different. Indeed, providing access to
data collected as a by-product will arguably generate lower incentives costs than
providing access to data collected as part of the data holder’s core business because,
in the former case, they are not collected for the sake of a data-centric business, but
rather in order to facilitate the pursuit of the undertaking’s core activity for which
data are a mean and not a goal. The undertaking having a superior market power has
to collect these data in any case for the pursuit of its core business, and having to
provide access to this data thus entails fewer incentive costs than having to provide
access to data that has been collected as part of its core-business. To be sure, this
does not mean that it does not entail any costs at all in terms of innovation and
incentives to collect the data, but rather that these costs are lower. This has to be
balanced with the fact that these data generated as a by-product could be re-used for
other purposes, potentially not linked to the undertaking’s core activity, thus
generating additional value for society. To give an example, one could think of data
collected by sensors on machines in an assembly line, which could be used for other
purposes. Indeed, these data are not collected and structured as a goal in itself, but as
a by-product of the core business, e.g. assembling cars in a factory, as a mean to
increase the efficiency of production.
Additionally, taking this factor into consideration in the trade-off is in line with
the analogous discussions pertaining to the ‘‘spin-off effect’’ for the sui generis
118 The ISO 29100 standard defines anonymisation as the: ‘‘process by which personally identifiable
information (PII) is irreversibly altered in such a way that a PII principal can no longer be identified
directly or indirectly, either by the PII controller alone or in collaboration with any other party’’ (ISO
29100:2011, point 2.2, available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:29100:ed-1:v1:en).
119 ‘‘The processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed
to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional
information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person’’ (Art. 4.5 GDPR).
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database right. Indeed, some authors question whether databases that are by-
products (‘‘spin-offs’’) of a main or other activity of the data producer should also be
protected by the sui generis database right.120 In some cases, protecting these spin-
off databases could give rise to absolute or unwanted natural monopolies.121
Nevertheless, while the above suggested distinction could have merit when
assessing the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of providing the access, it
must be underlined that, in practice, it might be extremely difficult to determine
whether a specific dataset has been collected as a by-product or as (one of) the
company’s core business(es). Indeed, this notion of ‘‘core business’’ is evolutive.
For instance, Monsanto-Bayer, historically considered as an agriculture and
bioengineering business, seems to be ‘‘heading towards becoming an information
broker with the acquisition of Climate Corp’’.122 Therefore, while the datasets
generated through the use of its agricultural and bioengineering products would
have likely been considered, in the past, as by-products of its core business, the
same conclusion might not necessarily be reached today. In fact, it could perhaps
even be argued that generating this agricultural data is part of its new core business,
which is to become a major agricultural data broker, and that it only sells
agricultural and bioengineering products in order to generate more data. In the same
vein, car manufacturers might attempt to argue that in the near future, with the
advent of autonomous cars, they will strive towards becoming ‘‘mobility data
companies’’ rather than simple ‘‘car builders’’. Accordingly, data generated by these
autonomous cars might no longer simply be considered as by-products generated by
these car manufacturers’ core business (selling cars), but might rather be considered
as part of their new core business (becoming leading mobility data companies) and
that these mobility companies only sell cars in order to generate more data.
In light of the above, access should only be provided to the well-identified
categories of non-personal data that the access seeker is dependent on, and only if a
trade-off has been made and concludes that the benefits for the access seeker trump
the costs of the access in terms of incentives to innovate and to collect data for the
data holder.
4.3 Providing Data Access as a Remedy
If the provisions on the abuse of economic dependence are deemed applicable in
cases of refusal to provide access to data and if the scope of the relevant data has
been identified, the final issue is to determine the remedy.
This article argues that the remedy should be a duty to provide access to the
categories of data on which the access seeker is dependent.123 These will have to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the trade-off between the benefits of
120 On this ‘‘spin-off effect’’ theory, see inter alia, Derclaye (2004), pp. 402–413; Hugenholtz (2003).
121 Derclaye (2004), p. 412; Hugenholtz (2003), p. 7.
122 Carbonell (2016), p.5.
123 For case law addressing data sharing as a remedy see: Autorité de la concurrence, decision No. 17-D-
06 (GDF Suez), 21 March 2017, available on http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/17d06.pdf.
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protecting the dependent access seeker and the costs of access in terms of incentives
to innovate and to collect data. The scope of the data covered by this remedy is the
main difference with a remedy sanctioning an abuse of dominant position. Indeed,
in the latter case, the remedy to an abuse resulting from the refusal to share the
access to ‘‘indispensable’’ data (essential facilities doctrine) would be an obligation
to share this ‘‘indispensable’’ data. Yet, as we have seen above,124 ‘‘indispensable
data’’ and ‘‘data that the access seeker is dependent on’’ are two different concepts,
having a different scope.
This access should, however, be remunerated, in order to counter-balance the
possible stifling effects that such a duty to share could have on the data holder’s
incentive to invest in data collection and analysis,125 and the price could be set on
the basis of FRAND (fair reasonable and non-discriminatory) remuneration
considerations. In this regard, Drexl points out that the Huawei126 judgment of
the ECJ, where the Court created a negotiation framework for the licensing of
SEPs,127 could ‘‘provide inspiration to deal with cases on access to data’’.128 It could
thus assist the parties to reach an agreement on the price of access.129 This
negotiation framework, applied to data, could be the following: (i) once the access
seeker has expressed its willingness to pay a FRAND remuneration for the data, the
data holder must present a specific, written offer specifying the price and the way in
which it is to be calculated; (ii) it is then for the access seeker to respond diligently
to that offer in good faith and without delaying tactics; (iii) should the access seeker
not accept the offer made to it, it must submit to the data holder, promptly and in
writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND remuneration; and (iv)
where no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND remuneration following
the counter-offer, the parties should, by common agreement, request that the
price be determined by an independent third party.
This independent third party could be the Support Centre for data sharing, created
in 2019, as it will be in a good position to assess the appropriateness of the
conditions of a data sharing agreement since it will be tasked with collecting the
best practices and existing model contract terms.130 It will thus have a basis of
comparison to assess the prices proposed by both parties. Moreover, it would
arguably also be in a good position to determine the technical means of the access (a
one-shot data transfer; daily/weekly/monthly transfers of bulks of data; real-time
124 See supra Sect. 4.1.1 Assessment of the State of Economic Dependence.
125 Here it should be mentioned that, regarding personal data, the GDPR provides that the exercise of the
portability right should be free (Art. 12.5 GDPR). It could thus seem incoherent to allow the data holder
to be remunerated for the access to the data via the abuse of economic dependence provisions if it has to
port the same data for free under the GDPR portability right. However, portability is free under the GDPR
in order to facilitate the exercise of the ‘‘data subjects’’ rights. Considering that here the access seeker is a
competing undertaking, and not a data subject, it makes sense to subject the access to a fee.
126 ECJ, 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei.
127 ECJ, Huawei, paras. 60–69.
128 Drexl (2016), p. 55. See also Richter and Slowenski (2019).
129 Drexl (2016), p. 55.
130 European Commission (2018b).
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access131 via application programming interfaces (APIs)132) if the parties do not
reach an agreement in this regard. Indeed, appointing experts in the Support Centre
for data sharing to assess these remuneration and technical issues, in cases where the
parties fail to reach an agreement, relieves the competition authorities from
assuming this role for which they are ill-suited.133
Additionally, in cases of termination of an existing business relationship, this
article argues that the price of access should remain the same as that which existed
prior to the refusal, for a reasonable period of time to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. For instance, this reasonable period of time could correspond to the
above-mentioned negotiation period. Though there might be an objective justifi-
cation for a price increase, ‘‘freezing’’ the price during this reasonable period should
ensure that the dependent undertaking will be put in a more comfortable bargaining
position during the negotiation period. This fits in with the goal of protecting the
weaker party. Accordingly, if that access was provided for free, as in the
PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter134 and hiQ v. LinkedIn135 cases in the USA, the access
should remain free during the negotiation period.
Moreover, and provided that such a difference can be established in practice, the
remuneration for the access to data generated as a by-product of a core business
should be lower than the remuneration for the access to data whose collection,
structuration and analysis is the core business of the data holder. This is because
providing access to data collected as a by-product will arguably generate lower
incentives costs than providing access to data collected as part of the data holder’s
core business.
Finally, it would be worth reflecting on the compatibility with the GDPR of a
competition authority’s decision imposing the provision of access to personal data
to a competitor. Indeed, such a remedy might, in some cases, come into conflict with
data protection law if the data is not anonymised136 prior to transfer.137 This
important research question will not be addressed at length in this article,138 but
three lawful bases could potentially justify, under certain conditions, the transfer of
this personal data, namely: consent; necessary processing for the compliance with a
131 The ‘‘freshness’’ and ‘‘up-to-dateness’’ of the data can indeed be of the utmost importance for certain
business models (see Kathuria and Globocnik (2019), pp. 18–19).
132 ‘‘In computer programming, an application programming interface (API) is a set of subroutine
definitions, communication protocols, and tools for building software. In general terms, it is a set of
clearly defined methods of communication among various components’’ (Source: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Application_ programming_interface).
133 Kathuria and Globocnik (2019), p. 17.
134 Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. (PeopleBrowsr),
No. C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013.
135 United States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation,
No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 14 August 2017, available at https://epic.org/amicus/cfaa/linkedin/2017-08-15-
PI-Order.pdf.
136 If the data is anonymised, and thus not simply pseudonymised, the data are no longer personal data
and the GDPR no longer applies.
137 Haucap (2018), p. 12.
138 On this question, see Kathuria and Globocnik (2019).
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legal obligation139 to which the controller is subject; and necessary processing for
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data holder and the access
seeker, provided that these interests are not overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects.140 For these three scenarios,
the access seeker would need to be very specific about the product/service it wants
to offer in order to comply with the principle of purpose limitation.141
5 Conclusion
The aim of this article was to demonstrate that the provisions against the abuse of
economic dependence could prove to be a valuable alternative to Art. 102 TFEU
and the essential facilities doctrine in order to deal with refusals, by non-dominant
undertakings, to provide access to data to undertakings having a weaker bargaining
power.
To do so, the provisions on the abuse of economic dependence in Belgian, French
and German law were presented, and two cases that occurred in the USA –
PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter and hiQ v. LinkedIn – were used as a main thread to shed
some light on the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a refusal to provide
access to data to be considered as an abuse of economic dependence. In essence, the
access seeker needs to show a state of economic dependence (lack of sufficient
reasonable possibilities to collect the data itself or elsewhere) and needs to show an
abuse of this state of economic dependence. This second condition implies the
demonstration of a conduct that constitutes a potential abuse (termination of an
existing business relationship or refusal to supply) and the demonstration of the
anticompetitive effect of this abuse (harm to the freedom to compete and to the
contestability of the market).
This analysis has been conducted on the basis of the national laws of three EU
Member States, as there is no harmonisation of the provisions pertaining to the
abuse of economic dependence in the EU. As it attempted to demonstrate that such
provisions could be an interesting alternative to Art. 102 TFEU, and in order to
avoid national law discrepancies on how these issues are handled in the internal
market, this article encourages the European Commission to think about creating an
abuse of economic dependence provision at the EU level that would allow to deal, in
specific cases, with refusals to provide access to data.
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